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Legislation and regulation are one means of controlling biomedical research and its 
clinical applications. This is seldom a one-off process since biomedical science 
evolves rapidly, dynamically and often unpredictably, and legislative and regulatory 
reviews are often required in response to the emergence of apparently new ethical 
and legal issues.  
In recent years, there have been several reviews of Australian biomedical legislation 
including the Australian Law Reform Commission’s “Inquiry into the Protection of 
Genetic Information in Australia” (“the ALRC Inquiry”) released in 2003 1, and the 
Legislative Review of the Prohibition of Human Cloning Act 2002 and the Research 
Involving Human Embryos Act 2002, (“the Lockhart Review”) which was released in 
December 2005 2. The ALRC Inquiry was a response to developments in genetic 
research, particularly genetic epidemiological research involving powerful new 
techniques such as microarrays (gene chips). The Lockhart Review was concerned 
with developments in stem cell research, including the use of embryos produced in 
the course of assisted reproductive technology (ART) and through cloning. 
These two reviews, when juxtaposed, highlight the key elements—both recurring 
and review-specific—of biomedical legislative review. 
In terms of recurring elements, the ALRC Inquiry and the Lockhart Review had much 
on common. Both were concerned with biomedical technologies that have the 
potential to both improve health and cause harm. Both were faced with the need to 
consider divergent views from experts and the general public. And both considered 
ethical issues to be central to their terms of reference. The ALRC Inquiry took the 
unprecedented step of forming a formal partnership with the Australian Health 
Ethics Committee while the Legislative Review Committee in the Lockhart review 
included two “ethicists” (one of whom is also a lawyer) and four scientists one of 
whom is also a “community advocate.”  
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While there was much common ground between the ALRC Inquiry and the Lockhart 
Review, there were also important differences, particularly in relation to the manner 
in which they responded to uncertainty regarding the likely clinical benefits of 
genetics and stem cell science respectively.  
While genetics (the subject of the ALRC Inquiry) is often assumed to provide a simple 
and definite answer to questions regarding the diagnosis and management of 
disease, in fact there are a number of epistemological, epidemiological/ 
methodological and technical issues that limit the ability of genetic science to deliver 
definitive benefits to the community.  Epistemological issues relate primarily to the 
low likelihood that the vast majority of diseases are primarily “genetic” (as opposed 
to environmental or degenerative) and the small number of “genetic” diseases that 
can be attributed to single genes (as opposed to the accumulation of multiple 
genetic abnormalities). Epidemiological/ methodological issues relate to the 
difficulty in interpreting large-scale genetic epidemiological results, uncertainty 
regarding the importance of so-called “junk DNA” and difficulty translating genetic 
epidemiological results into meaningful genetic tests (including pharmacogenomic 
testing), preventive strategies and therapies.  3-11 Technical issues relate primarily to 
the difficulties associated with delivery of gene therapies to individuals. 12  
In the ALRC Inquiry, the likely merit of the science (predominantly genetic 
epidemiological research involving gene chip or micro-array technology) was not 
open to debate. These scientific developments were seen, essentially 
unquestionably, as “breakthroughs” promising better medical diagnosis and 
treatments, and as a route to improved law enforcement. The issue in the ALRC 
Inquiry was not whether “the march of science” (in this case genetic technology) was 
likely to lead to medical breakthroughs, but rather how law could keep up with the 
science 1: 4.18 and, more specifically, how legislation could deal with the: “general fear 
about uncontrolled or ‘mad science’, the spectre of eugenics, threats of biological 
warfare, reports of xenotransplantation (transplants from one species to another), 
the loss of privacy, and the increased possibilities for genetic discrimination.” 1: 4.12 
Whilst scientists were involved significantly in the ALRC Inquiry, their input related 
primarily to whether these fears should outweigh the unequivocally imminent 
medical benefits of genetic science.  
The Lockhart Review, on the other hand, had among its central questions the issue 
of whether human embryonic stem cell (hESC) research is likely to lead to the 
medical benefits being promised by its proponents. One of its key questions was: 
“what are the limits of the use of in vitro fertilisation (IVF) and related 
methods (collectively known as assisted reproductive technology, or ART) and 
human embryo research?” 2: v 
It was recognised explicitly that there are “several challenges” to stem cell 
researchers in the development of cellular therapies, including difficulty maintaining 
stem cell lines in culture and difficulty controlling differentiation to derive 
populations of the required cells. The Committee also recognised that there is 
ongoing controversy among researchers as to whether adult or embryonic stem cell 
research is likely to be more successful, and that there is even debate about the 
nature of the biological entity known as an “embryo.”2: pp40-1 
In keeping with recognition of this scientific uncertainty, two sections of the Lockhart 
Report were devoted to debate surrounding “developments in medical and scientific 
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research.”  Controversy over the scientific merit of stem cell science was evident in 
the submissions which ranged from being highly supportive to being strongly 
sceptical. On the one hand, it was argued that: 
“there is still a strong case for ongoing efforts to derive new stem cell lines, 
particularly since this is a rapidly developing field in which technical 
innovation will result in steady improvement in the means for producing and 
maintaining hESC.” 2: p46   
In contrast, another submission claimed that: 
“Nothing in the experiments on human cloning in Britain or Korea have 
improved the likelihood that this will ever lead to successful therapies. There 
is still not a single therapy utilising human stem cells, whether from a cloned 
embryo or an embryo created by IVF.” 2: p47 
This difference between the ALRC Inquiry and the Lockhart Review is clearly related 
to the fact that the Lockhart Review was performed at a time when stem cell science 
is relatively new, whereas the ALRC Inquiry focused on a type of science (genetic 
research) that has been in development for decades. One could speculate that this is 
because embryo research raises what, to some, are fundamental ethical issues 
relating to killing—such that even small-scale scientific developments are seen as 
being ethically and legally charged. But the maturity or otherwise of the science does 
not seem to explain completely the difference between the two reviews in managing 
scientific uncertainty. While genetic research is more established than is stem cell 
research, it still raises numerous scientific issues (eg. relating to the capacity to 
attach meaning to microarray results and the problems of ignoring what used to be 
considered “junk DNA”) and will continue to do so as technology evolves.  This 
suggests that the exclusion of these concerns from the ALRC Inquiry may reflect not 
so much a difference between genetic science and stem cell science, but rather the 
fact that legislative reviews are driven by complex political, moral, social and 
economic concerns and limited by terms of reference, time-frames and resources. 
 
The challenge of scientific uncertainty in legislative review 
Whatever the reason for this difference between the two reviews, the fact remains 
that legislative review may occur at a time of significant and explicit scientific 
uncertainly and that this kind of uncertainty needs to be managed. Drafting 
legislation in the face of scientific uncertainty raises substantial ethical and epistemic 
challenges.  
First, it means that ethicists involved in legislative review need to consider not just 
questions of risk to research subjects and the moral status of people, animals or 
embryos, but also the possibility that the medical benefits being promised by some 
will never actually materialise. These issues are not “just” scientific, as it is highly 
unethical to put research subjects at any risk or engage in any morally controversial 
techniques if there is not likely to be medical benefit. This challenge was recognised 
by the Lockhart Committee which noted that: 
“…the higher the potential benefits of an activity, the greater the need for 
ethical objections to be of a high level and widely accepted in order to prevent 
that activity. Conversely, where benefits are not yet established, or where 
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there is widespread and deeply held community objection, then total 
prohibition through the legal system may be justified.” 2: xiv  
A second problem is the potential for asymmetry in arguments, such as the pitching 
of questions of scientific merit against deontological questions about the moral 
status of the embryo. Sensitivity to the existence of such asymmetry was evident in 
the Lockhart Review process, which characterised the debate as follows:  
Proponents of embryo research argued that the potential benefits of these 
activities meant that it would be unethical not to pursue the research and 
development made possible by such technologies. They also argued that 
current ART arrangements already sanction the possibility of the destruction 
of embryos, in the process of helping people to have a family, and hence not 
to allow embryo destruction to help people with other medical problems 
would be unfair. Opponents of embryo research argued that a human 
embryo, from the earliest stages of development, is an entity that deserves 
full protection and it is wrong to create such an entity for any purpose apart 
from ART treatment of a woman.” 2: xiv 
Third, there is also the problem of the integrity of arguments. There is a tendency to 
frame arguments as “scientific” when, in fact, the concerns are moral (or vice versa). 
The Review Committee recognised this problem, noting that: 
“much of the debate regarding the relative merits of …(stem cell)research was 
underpinned by differing attitudes towards the moral status of human 
embryos, and at times it was difficult to distinguish moral arguments from 
scientific or biological ones.” 2: p53  
 
Managing scientific uncertainty in health legislation 
While there is no simple solution to these challenges, steps can be taken to ensure 
that the problem of scientific uncertainty is dealt with as effectively as possible. 
Three related strategies might assist with the management of scientific uncertainty 
in legislative processes: 1) maximising philosophical symmetry and transparency, 2) 
managing “peer review” processes and 3) recognising that legislative review is a 
“discourse.”  
First, efforts could be made to ensure that arguments are as symmetrical and honest 
as possible. Three types of argument can be distinguished: 1) arguments that pitch 
scientific claims against conflicting scientific claims, 2) arguments that pitch moral 
concerns against conflicting moral concerns and 3) arguments that pitch scientific 
claims against moral concerns. It is worth reiterating that the last of these is not 
philosophically incoherent—there is nothing wrong, for example, with the argument 
that scientific benefits are less important than respect for embryos or vice versa. 
What matters, however, is that these various types of arguments are clearly 
distinguished and navigated in a consistent manner. The importance of philosophical 
symmetry and honesty was highlighted recently in the Australian debate about 
RU486 (the “abortion pill”) where there was perilous conflation of scientific 
arguments (whether the drug is safe and effective), moral arguments (whether 
abortion of this kind is morally permissible and whether women should have the 
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right to access such technologies) and political arguments (whether the government 
should have control over such decisions).  
A second strategy for managing scientific uncertainty is to recognise explicitly that 
some legislative review processes rely significantly on “peer review of scientific 
merit.” Peer review of scientific merit refers here to the process by which scientists 
review the “scientific merit” of other scientists’ work, where “scientific merit” refers 
to the quality of the research question and of the choice of methodology with which 
to answer this question. This places the legislative review process in a broader 
context since peer review of scientific merit occurs at several other stages of the 
research endeavour, including peer review of the scientific quality of funding 
proposals and of manuscripts submitted to journals.  
Placing legislative review in this broader context might assist by enabling guidelines 
used in these other peer review contexts to be adapted for use in the policymaking 
process, thus ensuring that the policy-level review of scientific merit is carried out, at 
the very least, to the standards set out for reviewers of funding proposals and 
potential journal publications. Placing legislative review in this context would also 
ensure that the problems that plague peer review in other settings (such as 
perceived bias, inconsistency, misunderstanding and destructive criticism)  13-18 are 
recognised and managed, as well as possible, in the legislative review setting.  
An understanding of peer review should not be limited to those “experts” involved 
directly in the legislative review process. Patients and the general public, too, need 
to understand how it is that assessments of scientific validity are reached, be they 
assessments of potentially promising but morally controversial clinical technologies 
(as in the case of stem cell science with its promise of widespread cures) or 
assessments of the latest controversy involving mobile phone radiation, red meat or 
vaccination side-effects. A recent UK working committee convened to address public 
understanding of peer review found that the public has little understanding of peer 
review and that scientists are defensive about the peer review process and about 
explaining its importance to others.  It is arguable that scientists, clinicians and 
ethicists involved in legislative review should take the opportunity presented in 
processes like the Lockhart Review to educate (other) health professionals, patients 
and the general public about both science and peer review, and to “put pressure on 
the people who bring research claims to the public to explain exactly what the status 
of the work is ”  19: p10 
A third strategy for managing scientific uncertainty, and one that was embraced to 
some extent by the Lockhart Committee, is to recognise that review processes, 
although legislative, cannot be viewed in a static, “legalistic” manner. Rather, they 
need to be viewed as ongoing social and communicative processes—i.e. 
“discourses”—which take place in the face of ongoing disagreement and uncertainty, 
both moral and scientific. 
In the case of the Lockhart Review, the inevitability of unresolvable dissent was 
recognised explicitly with the acknowledgment that:  
“Australian society is made up of diverse ‘communities’ with different 
perspectives, interests and values. Furthermore, an individual may be the 
member of multiple communities, each with divergent perspectives 
or’standards’, and these standards vary between and within communities and 
over time. Because of these divergent values and interests represented within 
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Australian society, the Committee has accepted that some disagreement will 
remain, whether or not any changes are made to the two acts.” 2: xiii  
Whilst this might represent an insurmountable problem from a philosophical 
perspective, the Review Committee, charged with a practical agenda, did not see it 
this way. For one thing, it was noted that “certain moral values are held in common 
by all communities, such as commitment to social justice and equity and to care of 
vulnerable people.” The Committee recognised, in other words, that dissent was 
inevitable, but that this dissent could be managed. 
The Lockhart Committee was explicit about the need for a discursive response to the 
“difficulties associated with drafting legislation in areas of rapid technological and 
scientific advance.” 2: p16 Their response involved the (implicitly) discursive 
endorsement of flexible “regulatory” rather than rigid “prescriptive” legislation on 
the basis that “a more flexible approach than that ordinarily provided by legislation 
can be achieved by the use of regulations, guidelines and rulings from a regulatory 
agency.” 2: p154 Another implicitly discursive recommendation was that the act be 
subject to a further review after several years in view of the fast-moving 
developments in the field. The Lockhart Committee’s discursive recommendations 
make particular sense in that the two Acts under review (which were passed in 
2002), each included a requirement for an independent review of its operation to be 
carried out in 2005. The Lockhart Review was, therefore, part of a larger discursive 
process.  
Viewing legislative review as a discourse allows such procedural strategies to be 
implemented on sound theoretical and practical grounds. Whilst discourses cannot 
be broken down into a series of mechanical “steps,” there are strategies for ensuring 
that discourses are as productive as possible. These include: allowing everyone to 
participate, ensuring that nobody is coerced into participating, allowing introduction 
and questioning of any assertion, and allowing expression of attitudes, desires and 
needs20, 21 In a sense, discursive processes create procedural symmetry even where 
there is philosophical asymmetry (as in the debate between moral status of the 
embryo and the need to cure disease).  
In theoretical terms, proponents of “discourse ethics” assume that there are always 
shared, fundamental moral norms and that our arguments can be designed in such a 
way that we can agree at least in terms of these norms.  This can occur even in the 
face of significant dissent and uncertainty. Indeed, one of the key characteristics of 
“discourse communities” is their capacity to tolerate dissent and uncertainly 22 
provided they share a basic “agenda” and a desire to balance interests, and provided 
they have the opportunity to engage in ongoing discussion that meets certain 
communicative criteria.23   
There are, therefore, several strategies that might assist with legislative reviews, 
such as the Lockhart Review, which need to take place in the face of scientific 
uncertainty. Recognising the potential for asymmetrical and disingenuous argument 
could be the first step towards clearer debate. Recognising that peer review of 
scientific merit is occurring in the legislative review setting could be the first step 
towards ensuring that the policy-level review of scientific merit is carried out, at the 
very least, to the standards set out for reviewers of funding proposals, ethics 
applications and potential journal publications. And recognising that these processes 
are “discourses” could be the first step towards a deeper understanding of the 
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foundational (discursive) nature of the process—an understanding that may have 
normative (diagnostic and therapeutic), as well as explanatory, power.24  
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